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2 INTERNATIONAL LAW : DECISIONS AND NOTES. 
neutrals just as justiciable in a court of prize as is breach 
of blockade or the carriage of contraband of war," 
page 189. 
The neutrals in the World War were in many cases 
weak or timid and belligerent disregard of neutral rights 
was the natural consequence. This has not been the 
case in wars of the later nineteenth century, and if wars 
subsequently occur it may not then be the case. It 
seems to be evident that the area of war is not limited 
nor its end hastened by meek submission on the part of 
neutrals to disregard of those rights which have been 
obtained after long years of struggle. 
THE "BERLIN."l 
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. 




October 7. 26, 29, 1914. 
[1914] p. 265 . 
October 29. SIR SA~J:UEL EvANs, president. In this 
case the Crown asks for the condemnation of the sailing 
ship, the Berlin, and her cargo as enemy property. No 
claim has been made in respect thereof; but it is, never-
theless, necessary to investigate the facts, and particu-
larly to ascertain whether by international law the ship 
is immune from capture as a fishing vessel. 
statementofthe The Berlin, as appeared from the ship's papers, was a 
case. 
German fishing cutter of 110 metric tons, built in 1892, 
and manned by a crew of 15 hands. She belonged to the 
port of Emden, and was owned by the Emden Herring 
Fishing Co. She had on board 350 empty barrels, 100 
barrels of salt, 50 barrels of cured herrings, and ship's 
stores in 15 barrels. She carried one boat and had t"\vo 
drifts of nets, consisting of 42 and 43 nets each drift, 
2 bush ropes, and a small steam boiler and capstan. The 
vessel, as appeared from her log, had been on a fishing 
1 Note as to sources of dccisions.-The single American decision, the Appam, involving 
American, British, and German rights, is from the Supreme Court Reports of the United 
States. The British decisions are from different sources as indicated in each case. The 
French decisions are from the Decisions du Conseil des Prises. The German decisions 
are translated from the Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin. 
The decisions are arranged in chronological order as in the "Volume published by the 
Naval \Var College in 1904, Hecent Supreme Court Decisions and Other Opinions and 
Precedents. 
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voyage in the North Sea for a considerable time. From 
July 27 on,vard she had been catching herrings, fishing 
in latitudes between 55° and 58° 30' N., and in longi-
tudes between 1° E. or W., and in depths of from 66 to 
148 meters. Her position on August 1-2, as given in 
her log, was latitude 55° 35' and longitude 0° 32', and 
on August 4-5, latitude 58° 28' and longitude 0° 33'. 
She \vas at these times, therefore, far out in the North 
Sea, at distances 100 miles, more or less, from the near-
est coast, namely, Great Britain, and 500 miles, more or 
less, from her home port, and from the German coast. 
She was brought into the port of Wick in the early morn-
ing of August 6 by the steamship Ailsa, and given into 
the possession of the chief officer of customs, \vho detained 
her as prize captured at sea. 
There was no direct evidence in the legal sense, as Capture. 
used in our municipal courts of law, of her capture by 
one of His Majesty's ships or of the place or time of her 
capture. It was reported to the officer of the Ailsa that 
she had been captured by H. M. S. Princess Royal, and 
by him that. she was handed over by the commander to 
the Ailsa to be taken into Wick Harbor. I saw a confi-
dential report made in the course of his official duty by 
the commander ~f H. M. S. Princess Royal of the cap-
ture, and it appeared that the exigencies of \Var rendered 
it necessary for him to request the Ailsa to take the cap-
tured vessel to Wick Harbor on his behalf. It appeared 
also that the capture took place at 11.30 a. m. on Aug-
ust 5. I should, apart from this, have presumed that 
the capture was not made until after \Var was declared 
on August 4 (11 p. m.). When the capture took place 
the vessel was in the North Sea in the position which I 
have approximately stated. 
It would have b_een advisable, inasmuch as I-Iis Ivt:ajesty's Evidence. 
ship was unable to take the captured vessel to port, or 
to put a prize cre\v on board for the purpose, for the 
commander of the Princess Royal to enter the time and 
place of capture in the vessel's log, or to make a declara-
tion in the presence of the vessel's master, lest objection 
might be made of the absence of direct legal evidence. 
But fortunately, in this court, I an1 entitled to act upon 
other evidence or reliable information, and to drnvv 
inferences therefrom, upon \Vhich the court may think it 
safe and just to act. Eminent judges (among them Lord 
Russell of Killowen) have conunented upon the strict 
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technicalities of some of the rules of evidence in our courts 
of law; and admirable and wholesome as they are in the 
main, it would appear that some of them tend to shut 
out facts which might with advantage to the course of 
justice be made known to the court. However this may 
be, the prize court is not bound by such confining fetters 
as our municipal courts. Upon this subject Doctor 
Lushington laid down the practice as follows: 
''With regard to the evidence to be produced in the 
Admiralty courts "\vith respect to blockades, and, indeed, I 
may say all other questions of prize, I believe the practice 
to have been, not to entertain objections to the admissi-
bility of the evidence offered, but to receive all that might 
be tendered; and certainly we have in this case the license 
of evidence of every kind and description which could well 
be offered to the consideration of the court. 
''I apprehend that this, so far as I know, the universal 
practice of the court, was adopted for several reasons. 
First, because the prize court being, not a n1unicipal 
court but a court for the administration of public law, 
was not restrained, with regard to evidence, by those 
rules which are applicable to questions of municipal law. 
"Secondly, it would be most difficult, even if possible, 
to have laid down any rules of evidence, because this 
court, having to concern itself with the transactions of 
various nations, could never construct a code in con-
formity with all their various rules, and consequently 
injustice might be done by excluding, in transactions in 
which they were interested, proofs recognized by them-
selves. 
"Thirdly, because of the extreme difficulty of procur-
ing what we are accustomed to call the best evidence, 
when such evidence is to be obtained from distant 
countries. 
''Fourthly, because, though the court may receive all, 
it will form its own judgment, according to the circum-
stances of the case, of the weight to be attributed to each 
species of evidence, and is not supposed to be liable to the 
error of giving undue importance to any evidence merely 
because it does not exclude it": The Franciska.2 
I have stated the conclusions of fact to "\Vhich I have 
come in the present case. 
2 (1855) Spinks 287; 2 Eng. P. C. 346. 
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The question now remains whether this vessel, the 
Berlin, is immune from capture as a coast fishing vessel. 
5 
h h . f h · t• · th" d th Immunity ot T e Is tory o t e varying prac ICes m IS an o er fishing vessels. 
countries of exempting from capture in war vessels 
engaged in coast fishing up to the year 1899 has been 
given in the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America in the case of the Paquete Habana and the Lola.3 
The judgment of the court was delivered by Gray, J. It 
is full of research, learning, and historical interest. 
As such an elaborate and complete resume is available 
in that judgment, it would be a work of supererogation 
for me to attempt to perform a similar task. 
'rhe conclusions stated by Gray, J., and which form 
the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court, were 
as follows: 
"This review of the precedents and authorities on the 
subject appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that at 
the present day, by the genaral consent of the civilized 
nations of the "\Vorld, and independently of any express 
treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of 
international law, founded on considerations of humanity 
to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual 
convenience of belligerent States, that coast fishing ves-
sels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and 
cre"\vs, unarmed, and honestly pursuing their peaceful 
calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt 
from capture as prize of vvar. The exemption, of course, 
does not apply to coast fishermen or their vessels if em-
ployed for a warlike purpose, or in such a 'vay a.s to give 
aid or inforn1ation to the enemy; nor when military or 
naval operations create a necessity to which all private 
interests must give way. Nor has the exemption been 
extended to ships or vessels employed on the high seas in 
taking 'vhales or seals, or cod, or other fish 'vhich are not 
brought fresh to market, but are salted or otherwise 
cured and made a regular article of con1merce. This 
rule of internationalla"\v is one which prize courts, admin-
istering the law of nations, are bound to take judicial 
notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any 
treaty or other public act of their O"\vn Government in 
relation to the matter." 
Since the date "\Vhen that judgment "\Vas pronounced lnli~:~e~e regu-
the matter has been dealt "\vith by Japan in its prize regu-
:115 u.s. 677. 
6 INTERNATIONAL LA\V: DECISIONS AND NOTES. 
lations, and in some of its prize court decisions, and it 
forms also the subject of an article in one of The Hague· 
conventions of 1907. 
Article 35 of the Japanese regulations governing cap-
tures at sea, which came into force on March 15, 1904, 
provides as follows: 
"All enemy vessels shall be captured. Vessels be-
longing to one of the following categories, ho\vever, shall 
be exempted from capture if it is clear that they are 
employed solely for the industry or undertaking for 
which they are in tended: 
" (I) Vessels employed for coast fishery. 
" (2) Vessels making voyages for scientific, philan-
thropic, or religious purposes. 
" (3) Lighthouse vessels and tenders. 
"(4) Vessels employed for exchange of prisoners." 
In the case of the Michael,~ heard in the Japanese Prize 
Court in 1905, which related to what was alleged to be a 
deep-sea fishing vessel, it was claimed that-
si~~~.anese deci- "The vessel, though a deep-sea fishing vessel, 'vas ~ot 
engaged in traffic forbidden in time of war, nor wa.s she 
carrying contraband of war, and consequently being 
harmless should be released, in accordance with the in-
tention which underlies the e~cemption from capture of 
small coastal fishing boats." Upon this the decision of 
the court ran as follo\vs: "The claimants also argued 
that the vessel should be released in accordance \vith the 
intention underlying the exemption from capture of 
small coastal fishing boats; but the usage of international 
la'v by \Vhich small coastal fishing boats are not captured 
arises mainly from the desire not to inflict distress upon 
poor people who are not connected with the \Var, and the 
principle can not be extended to a vessel like the },fichael, 
which \Vas the property of a company and engaged in 
deep-sea fishing." · 
The point was not raised in the higher prize (appeal) 
court. Similarly, in the case of the Alexander, 5 the 
sa1ne court pronounced as follo,vs: 
'' It is also argued by the claimants that the vessel 
should be released in accordance with the intention 
underlying the exe1nption from capture of small coastal . 
fishing vessels, but the usage of international la\v by 
4 Russian and Japanese Prize Cases (1913), vol. 2, p. 80. 
fl Russian and Japanese Prize Cases, vol. 2, p. 86. 
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,vhich small coastal fishing vessels are not captured 
arises mainly from the desire not to inflict distress on 
poor people who are not connected with the war, and 
clearly can not be extended to a vessel like the Alexander, 
the property of a company, and, moreover, engaged in 
deep-sea fishing." 
Upon appeal one of the grounds of appeal was : 
"Again, the reasoning in the decision appealed from, 
that as the exemption from capture of small coastal 
fishing vessels chiefly arose from a desire not to inflict 
distress upon poor people unconnected with the war, it 
could not therefore be extended to a vessel like the 
Alexander, which was engaged in deep-sea fishing, shows 
that the claimants' point had not been understood. 
What the claimants desired was that the imperial prize 
court should, in the light of recent developments in 
international law, not adhere to old usages, but create 
new precedents.'' 
Upon which the court adjudged in somewhat quaint 
fashion as follo"\VS: 
"The appellants also desired that a ne"\V precedent 
should be established in the light of recent developments 
of international law by the exemption from capture of a 
vessel "\vhich, as in the present case, was engaged in deep-
sea fishing. * * * The appellants' request that a 
new precedent should be created by the exemption from 
capture of a deep-sea fishing vessel is nothing more than 
the simple expression of their hopes, and this ground 
of the appeal is therefore also devoid of substance." 
7 
I do not propose to make any pronouncement in the ti!~1:~ .conven ­
case now before the court as to whether the German 
Empire or its citizens have in the circumstances of this 
war the right to claim the benefit of The Hague conven-
tion. But in order to show how the doctrine with "\Vhich 
I am now dealing has been treated by the nations with 
the progress of years and events, I refer to article 3 of 
The Hague convention, XI, 1907, \vhich is as follows: 
"Vessels employed exclusively in coast fisheries, or 
small boats employed in local trade, are exempt from 
capture, together \Vith their appliances, rigging, and cargo. 
This exemption ceases as soon as they take any part 
whatever in hostilities. The contracting powers bind 
themselves not to take advantage of the harmless char-
acter of the said vessels in order to use them for military 
purposes while preserving their peaceful appearance." 
British doctrine. 
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In this country I do not think any decided and reported 
case has treated the immunity of such vessels as a part 
or rule of the law of nations: vide the Young Jacob a nil 
Johanna 6 and the Lies bet van den Toll. 7 
But after the lapse of a century, I am of opinion that 
it has become a sufficiently settled doctrine and practice· 
of the law of nations that fishing vessels plying their in-
dustry near or about the coast (not necessarily in ter-
ritorial waters), in and by which the hardy people who 
man them gain their livelihood, are not properly subjects 
of capture in 'var so long as they confine themselves to· 
the peaceful work which the industry properly involves. 
The foundation of the doctrine is stated by Hall 8 as 
follows: 
"It is indisputable that coasting fishery is the sole 
means of livelihood of a very large number of families as 
inoffensive as cultivators of the soil or mechanics, and 
that the seizure of boats, while inflicting extreme hard-· 
ships on their owners, is as a measure of general appli-
cation wholly ineffective against the hostile State.'' 
The rule is for1nulated by Westlake (International Law, 
Part II, War, p. 133) in these terms: 
"Coast fisheries: Immunity from capture on the ground 
of their being enemies or enemy property, but not from 
capture and condemnation on the ground of breach of 
blockade, is enjoyed by the men, boats, and tackle em-
ployed in coast fisheries, and their cargoes of fresh fish, 
including fish kept alive by contrivances on their way to 
market; so long as the men and boats are not engaged 
in any warlike employment-in which scouting, exchang-
ing signals with the forces on their side, and carrying 
arms would be included-so long also as, in the opinion 
of the hostile Government or its naval commanders 
concerned, they are not likely to be engaged in any war-
like employment"--and he adds: ''If the opinion here 
referred to is only that of the naval commanders con-
cerned, the prize court before which the captures are 
brought will have to release them unless the warlike 
intention of the captured is proved to its satisfaction; 
but if the captures "rere made in pursuance of a Govern-
ment order, the prize court, in the absence of anything 
to the contrary in the constitution of the country, will 
e 1 C. Rob. 20. 1 (1804) 5 C. Rob. 283. s International Law (6th ed.), p. 446. 
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be bound by such an order as emanating from the 
authority under which it sits." 
It is obvious that in the process of naval warfare in the 
present day such vessels may without difficulty and with 
great secrecy be used in various ways to help the enemy. 
If they are, their imn1unity \Vould disappear; and it 
would be open to the naval authorities under the Crown 
to exclude from such immunity all similar vessels if there 
was reason for believing that some of them were utilized 
for aiding the enemy. And this seems to be the sense in 
which the second paragraph of article 3 of The Hague 
convention referred to should be regarded. 
As to the Berlin, I am of opinion that she is not \Vithin 
the category of coast fishing vessels entitled to freedom 
from capture; on the contrary, I hold that, by reason 
of her size, equipment, and voyage, she \Vas a deep-sea 
fishing vessel engaged in a commercial enterprise \Vhich 
formed part of the trade of the enemy country, and, as 
such, could be and \Vas properly captured as prize of war. 
I therefore decree the condemnation of the vessel and 
cargo, and order the sale thereof. 
THE "MIRAl\11CID." 
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. 
PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND AD~IIRALTY DIVISION. 
ADJ\IIRALTY. 
[IN PRIZE.] 
November 23, 1914. 
[1914] p. 71. 
9 
Decision. 
The subject matter of the claim in this case is a part statement of the 
case. 
cargo of 16,000 bushels of wheat carried on the steamship 
Miramichi, which was seized or captured as enemy 
property on September 1, 1914, in the circumstances 
hereinafter mentioned. 
The steamship Miramichi was a British ship. The 
cargo of wheat to which the claim relates was shipped 
at Galveston, Tex., and \Vas stowed, \vith other \Vheat_, 
in holds 1, 4, and 6 of the vessel. It was shipped in the 
month of July, 1914, before the commencement of the 
war, and without any anticipation of war. It \Vas 
destined for the port of Rotterdam, and was intended to 
